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Introduction
In 2016 the Environmental Defence Society embarked on 
an analysis of compliance monitoring and enforcement of 
environmental law in New Zealand (Brown, 2017).1 The 
responsibilities for ensuring that the aspirations of law and 
policy are met with respect to the environment are shared 
across a wide range of acts and several agencies. Different 
agencies operationalise compliance in different ways, affording 
it different priority and thus achieving different outcomes.  
This article summarises the key findings of the project and 
briefly canvasses the primary groups of solutions. New 
Zealand’s environment would benefit from a far more robust 
approach to achieving regulatory outcomes and this requires 
injections of resourcing and capability into our enforcement 
agencies and dissolution of prevailing political influences.
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environmental enforcement in  
New Zealand Non-compliance with environmental 
protections has wide-ranging impacts. 
Our fragile biodiversity and ecosystems 
have undergone rapid environmental 
change, and the compliance gap amplifies 
the impact of human activities on nature. 
Closing or at least narrowing the 
compliance gap is a crucial task if the 
aspirations of law and policy are to be 
achieved. However, such endeavours 
bump up against normative views that 
environmental offending is a ‘victimless 
crime’ and hence it can be a struggle to 
muster the resources necessary to 
mobilise solutions (De Prez, 2000).
A range of prior reports have 
highlighted regulatory failure in New 
Zealand and the factors that contribute to 
it (see, for example, Black, 2014). The 
agencies and regimes that formed the 
subject of the Environmental Defence 
Society analysis are set out in Table 1.
Some definitions
Compliance, monitoring and 
enforcement are not necessarily well-
understood terms to the general public. 
For clarity, and for the purposes of this 
research, they were defined as follows:
Compliance means adherence to the law.
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Monitoring means the activities carried 
out by agencies to assess compliance 
with the law, and to respond to 
complaints from the public about 
potential breaches (i.e. compliance 
monitoring).
Enforcement means the actions taken by 
agencies to respond to non-
compliance with the law (inclusive of 
formal and informal actions) with the 
aim of ensuring compliance (Ministry 
for the Environment, 2016).
The collective term for the function 
‘compliance, monitoring and enforce-
ment’ is abbreviated to CME henceforth.
The methodology 
Assessing the effectiveness of 
environmental regulators from the outside 
is challenging: data are often limited and 
many agencies appear to give limited 
priority to the function, thus retaining 
minimal staff with appropriate expertise 
to engage with external researchers. 
The assessment was undertaken using a 
bespoke methodology that could be scaled 
to the amount of information available 
within any one regime. The methodology 
recognised that the effectiveness of 
an environmental compliance regime 
depends on three key factors:
•	 the	robustness	of	the	underlying	
regulatory provisions for the 
compliance, monitoring and 
enforcement function;
•	 the	operationalisation	of	the	function	
by the agency, including how it relates 
to other roles they may have; and
•	 the	practical	implementation	of	the	
role, including the history of 
enforcement action taken.
Information was sourced from all 
regimes on these three dimensions and 
used to build an overall picture of the 
approach and its outcomes for the public 
interest. Compiling the information was 
achieved through semi-structured 
interviews with staff, Official Information 
Act requests and, in the case of councils, a 
nationwide ten-question survey carried 
out in the middle of 2016.
Some regimes had a significant 
amount of information. For example, 
since the advent of the Resource 
Management Act 1991 the Ministry for 
the Environment has collected data every 
year from implementing agencies 
(councils). While the data are of varying 
quality and have limited comparative 
value over time due to changes in 
questions year to year, there is a 
voluminous amount. By contrast, many 
regimes carried comparatively scant data 
due to a lack of robust recording systems. 
The research was naturally limited by that 
and by how much could be obtained. As 
such, the methodology required 
assembling as much data as possible to 
establish an understanding of the regime 
and build a narrative from there.
The next section outlines key learning 
across these three areas of inquiry, albeit 
in only limited detail. Readers are referred 
to the main report for more substantial 
information.
Gradual improvement evident
There is an observable general trajectory 
of improvement in all agencies towards 
better and more robust practice, even 
in the most politicised of contexts. 
Regional authorities have collaborated 
successfully in establishing a collective 
strategic direction towards risk-based 
compliance management (Compliance 
and Enforcement Special Interest Group, 
2016). Central government innovations 
such as Crown Law’s Public Prosecutions 
Framework and the Government 
Regulatory Practice Initiative (G-Reg) led 
by the Ministry for Business, Innovation 
and Employment also signal a wider 
appetite for continuous improvement of 
regulatory practice. This is consistent with 
international trends towards increasing 
professionalisation of environmental 
enforcement. 
Agency overview
The ministry, the councils and the RMA
The Resource Management Act 1991 
is the core legislation in New Zealand, 
not least because of the sheer breadth 
of the act and the number of agencies 
implementing it. The Ministry for the 
Environment has an oversight role and is 
charged with national-level reporting and 
thought leadership. It does not, however, 
take an operational role. That is left to the 
78 councils dotted over the landscape, of 
which there are four main types: regional 
councils, charged with the majority of the 
protection of the natural environment; 
district and city councils which address 
vegetation controls and other more 
amenity-based aspects of local plans; and 
unitary authorities, which straddle both 
levels of policy. Seventy-eight different 
versions of RMA compliance practice 
have proliferated under the gaze of the 
Ministry for the Environment, who 
appear to have paid scant regard to the 
whole function of CME since the advent 
of the regime.
Councils afford CME varying priority, 
and encounter two key barriers in carrying 
Table 1: Agencies and regimes that formed the scope of the report
Agency Regime
Ministry for the Environment 
and councils
Resource Management Act 1991
Department of Conservation Conservation Act 1987, Wildlife Act 1953, Marine 
Mammals Protection Act 1978, Marine Reserves Act 
1971, Native Plant Protection Act 1934
Queen Elizabeth II National 
Trust 
Queen Elizabeth II National Trust Act 1977
Fish and Game New Zealand Wildlife Act 1953, Conservation Act 1987
Environmental Protection 
Authority 
Exclusive Economic Zone and Extended Continental Shelf 
(Environmental Effects) Act 2012
Land Information New Zealand 
– Crown Property
Crown Pastoral Land Act 1998
Land Act 1948
Overseas Investment Office Overseas Investment Act 2005
Ministry for Primary Industries Forests Act 1949 (Sustainable Forest Amendment Act 
1993)
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out this often adversarial function: 
resourcing and politics (which are, of 
course, interlinked). Councils are political 
entities, governed by a group of people 
elected by the local community to carry 
out their functions under the act and to 
further locally-based aspirations. 
Councillors sometimes take their place at 
the table thanks to the coordinated voting 
of vested interests, some of which may 
take umbrage at the council energetically 
carrying out its CME role. In the worst 
cases this creates an environment of 
politicised decision making, including the 
intentional underfunding of this crucial 
function lest it offend those who must not 
be offended.
Other conflicts exist. Councils are 
charged with an explicit economic 
development role; this too can see 
politicised decision making dribble down 
much further than the elected body and 
into the hearts and minds of management 
and staff, who have incentive to forget 
about concepts such as an appropriate 
separation of governance and operations. 
This separation is crucial for compliance: 
elected representatives should rightly set 
the policy and direction for CME through 
governance channels, and then they must 
stay out of day-to-day decision making. 
Unfortunately, our research found that 
separation to be a little murky in many 
councils: eight district councils need the 
approval of their elected representatives 
to prosecute; the majority of district and 
city councils do not have an enforcement 
policy (on what are they basing their 
decisions?); and there is strong evidence 
of informal political meddling in many 
regional councils. This simply cannot do.
DOC and wildlife enforcement
An enormous regulatory role has 
been bestowed upon the Department 
of Conservation, and it is straining 
underneath it. More than 25 pieces 
of legislation are largely DOC’s alone 
to enforce and it attempts this with 
minimal resourcing. It has a strong 
national compliance team and a decent 
in-house training course, but the dogged 
determination of a few has not been 
enough to contest the ‘business-friendly’ 
face of the partnership transition and the 
overall dearth of resourcing. Compliance 
at present is generally devolved to local 
offices, resources being distributed at 
the discretion of the local operations 
manager. Given that three-quarters of its 
prosecutions arise from just 10% of its 
offices, it seems clear that compliance is 
afforded different priorities in different 
locations. Some of the legislation is 
enforced far more energetically than 
others too: take the Taupo trout fishery, 
Auckland marine reserve compliance and 
West Coast whitebaiting out of the picture 
and there are not a lot of prosecutions 
left to share around the remainder of the 
law. The effort is uneven and the strategy 
is unclear. To DOC’s credit, a significant 
programme of improvement is under 
way, and hopefully a new era of more 
robust conservation law enforcement is 
imminent.
MPI and indigenous forestry
The Ministry for Primary Industries is 
a super-ministry, juggling innumerable 
functions and inherent conflicts. The 
dramatic revelations in 2016 about 
fisheries enforcement put the public on 
notice that MPI may not be being entirely 
even-handed in its decision making 
(Heron, 2016). There is not a great deal 
of data around the administration of 
indigenous forestry on private land, and 
formal enforcement appears rare. Part of 
the reason might be that MPI has only 
two tools at its disposal when uncovering 
non-compliance in indigenous forestry, 
non-statutory goading and prosecution. 
The former is often ineffective, and the 
latter usually very costly. The absence of 
a middle-ground tool to address lower-
level offending is an issue faced not only 
by MPI, but also by the Environmental 
Protection Authority (EPA) and DOC. An 
infringement fine regime would help here.
The EPA and the deep, blue sea
Far beyond the horizon, the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and Extended Continental 
Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012 
(EEZ Act) kicks in. The 12-nautical-mile 
limit marks the beginning of an area 
of burgeoning economic activity. The 
relatively newly minted EPA has it within 
its powers to implement the act. The act 
applies to oil and gas operations and 
newer areas of economic development, 
such as the controversial seabed mining 
such as that proposed off the Taranaki 
coast and on the Chatham Rise. It is early 
days for both the act and the regulator, so 
we make no substantive assessment of the 
EPA; that would be premature.
Much work is under way internally 
developing systems and training to 
prepare the officers and the organisation 
for their growing role, which is good to 
see. An annual compliance plan is publicly 
available, as is a prosecution policy 
(Environmental Protection Authority, 
2017, 2013), although senior staff advise 
of constrained resourcing limiting that 
roll-out. The report points out that a 
weakly resourced regulator and a powerful 
and small regulated community are the 
ingredients of regulatory capture, and 
that time will tell how effective compliance 
will be. There is also strong evidence that 
public interest is high: an earlier instance 
in which the EPA elected not to prosecute 
an offending party drew an impressive 
15,000 emails from Greenpeace supporters 
– much pressure for a fledgling regulator; 
let us hope they get it right.
The QEII Trust and private land conservation 
covenants
In the 1970s visionary Waikato farmer 
Gordon Stephenson and others estab-
The dramatic revelations in 2016 about 
fisheries enforcement put the public 
on notice that MPI may not be being 
entirely even-handed in its decision 
making ...
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lished the Queen Elizabeth II National 
Trust, with legislation of the same 
name being passed by Cabinet in 1977. 
The trust now has oversight of nearly 
200,000 hectares of covenanted private 
land, protected for its open space and 
conservation values. An important role for 
the trust is ensuring that the conditions 
set out within covenant agreements are 
adhered to. These conditions vary, but 
include requirement to do pest control 
and maintain fencing, and avoid grazing 
all or some areas. Field officers check 
the compliance of conditions and, while 
compliance rates are high, sometimes 
more serious enforcement action is 
needed. This demands that the Trust step 
back from a partnership approach and 
instead adopt a more stringent regulatory 
manner. Successful litigation against 
the errant Netherland Holdings in 2015 
demonstrated its willingness to play this 
card, and it will need to do it more often 
over time to maintain that credibility.
Fish and Game New Zealand
The exotic species dimensions of the 
Wildlife and Conservation acts are 
primarily enforced by Fish and Game 
officers and their team of honorary 
rangers nationwide. The enforcement role 
of both acts is of course shared with the 
Department of Conservation, although 
the vast majority of prosecutions are 
carried out by Fish and Game. Fish and 
Game is a statutory entity, but is not a 
public prosecution agency like most of 
its peers in central government (as is the 
QEII Trust). Like MPI, Fish and Game 
and DOC struggle with the absence 
of a proper range of tools to carry out 
enforcement effectively. While DOC 
makes wide use of diversion processes 
through the courts, Fish and Game 
devised its own workaround: the national 
reparations policy (2016).
Land Information New Zealand
Housing both Crown Property and the 
Overseas Investment Office among other 
sub-entities, Land Information New 
Zealand is a less prominent environment 
regulator compared to many others. But 
its role in protecting our fragile high 
country and special values on land subject 
to overseas purchase is significant. What 
is not significant, however, is the degree 
of transparency as to how the CME 
function is managed in respect of both of 
these areas. Most compliance monitoring 
appears reliant on self-reporting, and 
the capacity from random and front-line 
audit is sparse. 
The relevant regimes themselves are 
also highly discretionary. For example, in 
the event that appropriate permission is 
not sought prior to purchase, pursuant to 
the Overseas Investment Act 2005, the 
Overseas Investment Office can impose an 
‘administrative penalty’ of up to $20,000 
on the applicant – a large sum when 
compared with any other penalty an 
agency can unilaterally impose – and 
process approval retrospectively. Do these 
regimes strike an appropriate balance 
between regulator discretion and 
transparency for the public? 
Unpacking the key issues
Casting one’s eye across such a range of 
regulators and regimes, one might expect 
to find different key issues with each. But 
in fact there is remarkable convergence. 
Four recurring themes stood out and 
they are canvassed briefly here, along with 
some of the solutions proposed in the 
report. 
Robust underlying law makes CME more 
effective and efficient
Much of our environmental law is old, 
out of date and lacking in the tools that 
enable behaviour change to be achieved at 
least cost in the shortest amount of time. 
This applies not just to the old acts either: 
the relatively new EEZ Act is also without 
an infringement regime, for example. 
Interestingly, many of the flaws in the 
legislation have also been long understood 
but just lain unaddressed, partly because 
compliance just hasn’t seemed like an 
organisation priority; nor has Parliament 
afforded priority to said changes. Recent 
improvements to the Wildlife Act 1953 
– and there are more in the pipeline – 
demonstrate the kind of changes needed 
to help the agencies do their job properly.
Modern and fit-for-purpose law is 
what is needed and this means much of 
our legislation is ripe for a makeover. The 
solutions set out in Last Line of Defence 
also include stronger national guidance 
on CME, most particularly from the 
Ministry for the Environment to the 78 
councils operating nationally. While local 
determinism is acceptable on some fronts, 
there are areas where greater alignment 
and consistency could easily be achieved, 
and where statutory limits could be better 
clarified (e.g. cost recovery, thresholds for 
escalation, evidentiary tests, etc).
Boots on the ground, and the right kind of 
boots
Compliance officers are usually born, not 
made: certain personality traits make for 
good officers, in addition to training that 
prepares them for the technical aspects of 
their role. It is clear from many agencies 
that ensuring that the right person wears 
those boots is a relatively low priority. In 
fact, having such people at all seems low 
priority. For example, ten district councils 
report zero resources for CME, and more 
than 40 have fewer than one full-time 
equivalent to do the job (often shared 
with other tasks). Meanwhile, consents are 
issued and permitted activity standards 
are included in district and regional plans, 
pinning hope on people who simply don’t 
exist to ensure that the behaviour change 
the policy aims for occurs. 
The lack of resourcing is in part due to 
the politically unpalatable nature of the 
function, and the chronic underfunding 
of many public agencies, full stop. But the 
Compliance officers are usually born, not 
made: certain personality traits make for 
good officers, in addition to training that 
prepares them for the technical aspects 
of their role. 
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lack of training and the limited recognition 
of compliance as a career choice are 
important too. High turnover and a 
predominance of weakly trained front-
line officers are a major risk to a regulator. 
Our report recommends the development 
of far more effective training and express 
recognition of officers and agencies that 
demonstrate competence in this 
important field. We suggest a programme 
of agency accreditation (similar to that for 
consenting already in place) and a 
professional network to recognise and 
support this important career path, not 
unlike those already available for planners, 
lawyers and engineers.
Independent decision making
New Zealand has few pure regulators; 
most agencies carry regulatory roles 
alongside others. MPI juggles trade 
facilitation and trade regulation roles, 
DOC wrestles with partnership ambitions 
alongside its significant environmental 
enforcement role, and councils too have 
to reconcile economic development and 
environmental protection mandates with 
little guidance. The role of governance 
is to set strategy and policy directions, 
and the day-to-day decisions are not to 
be interfered with. A credible regulator 
makes individual enforcement-related 
decisions based on facts, and there is no 
room for politics. This is often not the 
case and this must urgently change. 
Whether such change can be brought 
about by adjusting the people and the 
practice remains to be seen. Or are we 
asking too much and do we need to 
consider much bigger shifts in our 
institutional arrangements? At the very 
least it starts with making it crystal clear 
that such behaviour is inappropriate, and, 
further along, that there is a significant 
risk of sanction for those indulging in this 
deeply unfair meddling. All agencies 
should have clear and appropriate 
prosecution and enforcement policies 
that are publicly available and subject to 
quality control. The next challenge is to 
ensure that they are adhered to.
Audit and oversight
Part of the reason political interference in 
decision making can persist is that there 
exists a serious lack of oversight of the 
activities of environmental enforcement 
agencies. As a result, the public has little 
idea of what is happening and little 
assurance that this crucial role is being 
performed effectively. In one regime, 
voluminous data have been collected over 
an extended period of time (the RMA), 
and yet the Ministry for the Environment 
has not chosen to use that information in 
an evaluative way. Over and over, the same 
councils have reported zero prosecutions, 
zero fines and zero staff for CME, and 
nobody appears to have thought to 
question why. Is that a fair reflection of 
public expectations?
To facilitate greater transparency we 
recommend investment in information 
technology systems that track and validate 
compliance approaches. Many agencies 
do not record much information about 
their CME roles – some do not even have 
the IT infrastructure to do so (e.g. DOC) 
– and many annual reports barely mention 
the function. Without any data, laggards 
can prosper while good performers are 
ignored. But which data, and why?
The quality and relevance of that 
which is collected is highly variable. Often 
annual reports include one or two random 
figures that pertain to CME, but lack any 
context. It would seem that we have a 
limited notion of what success even looks 
like. As such, a major recommendation of 
our report is for the ministry (or another 
entity) to develop thought leadership on 
appropriate evaluation of environmental 
regulators, and to then establish a 
reporting framework around this. Making 
it common across environmental 
regulators would enable easy comparison, 
compared to the challenge of 
benchmarking that exists at present.
Summary
The difficulty of achieving the desired 
outcomes of environmental law due to 
the ever-present compliance gap is by no 
means unique to New Zealand. Globally, 
environmental offending struggles to 
attract the attention and resources needed 
to be effectively combatted. The evidence 
suggests that while our environmental 
regulators are on a trajectory of 
improvement, there are also some big 
issues to be sorted out. The resources 
poured into the promulgation of law 
and policy are enormous, and unless that 
energy is matched with the dogged process 
of driving the need for behaviour change 
home, it is simply wasted investment.
1 This research was supported by the New Zealand 
Law Foundation, the Ministry for the Environment and 
FoundationFootprint Ltd and was published by the 
Environmental Defence Society in February 2017.
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